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Abstract— Technology development efforts in autonomy and
cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other,
over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing
effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a
single framework. To this end, we propose the two-player
partially observable stochastic game formalism to capture both
high-level autonomous mission planning under uncertainty and
adversarial decision making subject to imperfect information.
We show that synthesizing sub-optimal strategies for such
games is possible under finite-memory assumptions for both
the autonomous decision maker and the cyber-adversary. We
then describe an experimental testbed to evaluate the efficacy
of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing ubiquity of autonomous systems, their use
in ever more remote and unknown environments, and the in-
creasing sophistication of cyber threats are driving a need for
unprecedented system resilience, coupling robust autonomy
with efficient cyber-defense strategies [10], [7]. Consider the
push to develop swarms of smallsats in low Earth orbit. Cost-
effective operations of such swarms require improved auton-
omy capabilities, both onboard and on the ground. However,
complex autonomous behavior makes such systems suscep-
tible to malicious tampering. Similarly, current unmanned
air/ground/underwater systems rely on various signals for
communication and localization and are already vulnerable
to spoofing attacks. A GPS spoofing attack against such
systems could result in malicious GPS coordinates being fed
to the vehicle, causing it to be (mis)guided on an adversary’s
behest [8]. A resilient autonomous system should be able to
detect attacks against itself, diagnose the probable causes,
and automatically take corrective actions while ensuring the
system’s low/high-level goals and objectives are achieved.
However, a primary challenge to achieving this vision of
integrated cyber and physical resilience is that technology
development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense are
presently evolving independently of each other. Our work
aims to reverse this trend. Our overall goal is to develop
and demonstrate resilient autonomy for autonomous agents,
by extending existing risk-aware planning and execution ca-
pabilities [14] with a combination of state-of-the-art model-
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Fig. 1. A simplified model of an autonomous system.
based reasoning for situational and self-awareness and active
cyber-defense mechanisms.
Current cyber adversaries can study the defender’s be-
havior, identify security caveats, and modify their actions
adaptively [15]. To tackle these security challenges, cyber-
agents require adversarial decision making under uncertainty.
Furthermore, agents cannot directly observe their adversary’s
true state and/or intention. Hence, active cyber-defense meth-
ods necessitate dealing with partial observations [2] and im-
perfect/incomplete information. A game-theoretic framework
known as partially observable stochastic games (POSG) [11]
provides a promising mathematical formalism for these ca-
pabilities.
In this paper, we report our preliminary methodology
based on POSGs to integrate high-level autonomy and ad-
versarial decision making. Our method based on POSGs
is aimed at addressing cyber-physical threats caused by
active cyber-adversaries, for example, as seen in the Stuxnet
attack [12], wherein the attacker modifies their strategy in
reaction to defensive actions. We show that the solution to
the POSG can be cast as an optimization problem. Then, we
propose an experimental setup to evaluate our technique. In
summary, we hope to make the following contributions:
• Novel high-level resilient autonomy in the presence of
active cyber-attacks leveraging the POSG framework;
• Demonstration of an integrated ”defense-in-depth” ca-
pability for secure autonomy of cyber-physical systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
discusses the threat model for a cyber-physical system such
as an UAV, an autonomous robot, or a swarms of space-
crafts; Section III discusses our proposed methodology using
POSGs; Section IV discusses our experimental evaluation
methodology followed by our conclusions and future work
in Section V.
II. CYBER-PHYSICAL THREAT MODEL
In this section, we first describe a model of an autonomous
system, followed by a description of adversarial goals and a
high-level taxonomy of threats.
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Fig. 2. Cyber-Physical Threat Model
Figure 1 shows a simplified model of an autonomous sys-
tem (agent), containing two subsystems: cyber and physical.
The cyber subsystem encapsulates functionality such as com-
mand and control logic, operating system, applications and
any communications between the cyber components. Cyber
components may be located on the agent or be external to
the agent. Multi-agent systems may have a centralized cyber
subsystem coordinating the agents. The physical subsystem
encapsulates entities such as sensors, actuators, physical
communication channels, and any other hardware comprising
the autonomous system. An attacker would want to gain
malicious control, cause damage, or deny service to prevent
the autonomous system from achieving its goals. Referring to
Figure 2, there are four different kinds of attacks an adversary
could use to achieve their goals.
Cyber Attack
A cyber attack directly targets the components in
the cyber subsystem. For example, a denial-of-
service attack against the communication network
of an autonomous system is an example of a cyber
attack.
Physical Attack
A physical attack targets the components in the
physical subsystem. For example, a ballistic impact
is a type of physical attack which could damage
physical components of an autonomous system. A
physical attack often requires physical proximity to
the system.
Cyber-Physical Attack
In a cyber-physical attack, an attacker leverages
a cyber vulnerability with the intent to affect the
physical subsystem. For example, malicious input
injection attacks such as the malicious command or
data injection seen in recent car hacks [9]. Cyber-
physical attacks are often the most devastating as
they can be initiated remotely, and cause serious
damage to the physical subsystem.
Physical-Cyber Attack
In a physical-cyber attack, an attacker influences
the cyber subsystem by attacking the components
in the physical subsystem. For example, an attack
on the physical sensors of an autonomous system
(say the IMU), may cause inaccurate data to be sent
upstream to the cyber components (for example,
incorrect location information), thereby causing in-
correct decision-making and response by the cyber
component.
In our work, we focus on the cyber-physical and physical-
cyber kinds of attacks, as these attacks cross boundaries and
as such, are often more subtle and difficult to diagnose, and
consequently pose significant risk to missions. In addition,
existing cyber or physical defenses generally do not protect
against these attacks.
In the next section, we describe a mathematical formalism
considering cyber-physical and physical-cyber attacks.
III. METHODOLOGY: TWO-PLAYER POSG
A POSG is formally defined as follows.
A probability distribution over a finite or countably infinite
set X is a function µ : X → [0, 1] ⊆ R with ∑x∈X µ(x) =
µ(X) = 1. The set of all distributions on X is Distr(X). The
support of a distribution µ is supp(µ) = {x ∈ X |µ(x) >
0}. A distribution is Dirac if |supp(µ)| = 1.
Definition 1: A stochastic game (SG) is a tuple G =
(S, sI , Act,P) with a finite set S = S◦ ∪S of states, a set
S◦ of Player 1 states, a set S of Player 2 states, the initial
state sI ∈ S, a finite set Act = Act◦ ∪Act of actions, and
a transition function P : S × Act → Distr(S). We define
costs using a state-action cost function C : S×Act → R≥0.
A Markov decision process (MDP) is an SG in which
S◦ = ∅, and consequently S = S. A path of an SG G is
an (in)finite sequence pi = s0
a0−→ s1 a1−→ s, where s0 = sI,
si ∈ S, ai ∈ Act , and P(si, ai) 6= 0 for all i ∈ N. For finite
pi, last(pi) denotes the last state of pi. The set of (in)finite
paths of G is PathsGfin (Paths
G).
To define a probability measure over the paths of an SG
G, the non-determinism needs to be resolved by strategies.
Definition 2 (SG strategy): A strategy σ for G is a pair
σ = (σ◦, σ) of functions σi : {pi ∈ PathsGfin | last(pi) ∈
Si} → Distr(Act) such that for all pi ∈ PathsGfin , {a |
σi(pi)(a) > 0} ⊆ Act , i ∈ {◦,}.
A Player-i strategy σi (for i ∈ {◦,}) is memoryless if
last(pi) = last(pi′) implies σi(pi) = σi(pi′) for all pi, pi′ ∈
dom(σi). It is deterministic if σi(pi) is a Dirac distribution
for all pi ∈ dom(σi).
A strategy σ for an SG resolves all non-deterministic
choices, yielding an induced MC, for which a probability
measure over the set of infinite paths is defined by the
standard cylinder set construction [5]. These notions are
analogous for MDPs.
In our framework, S◦ consists of the physical and mission
states, e.g. robot(s) location and obstacles, or the autonomous
decision maker; whereas, S corresponds to the internal
states of the cyber-adversary. These states are not directly
observable to either player; the players must infer the prob-
ability of their opponent being at different states based on
the observations received at every step of the game. Thus,
we have a POSG as follows (see Figure 3).
Definition 3: A partially observable stochastic game
(POSG) is a tuple G = (G,Z◦, Z, O◦, O), with G =
(S, sI , Act,P) the underlying SG of G, Z◦ and Z are
Fig. 3. Three stages of an example POSG. The states of the players need
to be estimated based on the observations, and in the case of the attacker
, counteracted. The game starts at so with an initial observation z.
finite set of observations for Player 1 and 2, respectively,
and O◦ : S → Z◦ (O : S → Z) the observation function
for Player 1 (Player 2).
We lift the observation function to paths: For pi = s0
a0−→
s1
a1−→ sn ∈ PathsMfin , the associated observation sequence
is O(pi) = O(s0)
a0−→ O(s1) a1−→ O(sn).
Definition 4 (POSG Strategy): An observation-based
strategy σi for Player i in POSG G is a strategy σi for
Player i in the underlying SG G such that σi(pi) = σi(pi′)
for all pi, pi′ ∈ PathsGfin with Oi(pi) = Oi(pi′).
Applying the strategy σ = (σ◦, σ) to a POSG G resolves
all nondeterminism and partial observability, resulting in the
induced Markov chain Gσ .
However, since POSGs simply extend POMDPs to mul-
tiple players, computing optimal strategies requires infinite
memory [6]. To circumvent this difficulty, we represent
observation-based strategies with finite memory and we
use finite-state strategies (FSSs) (see also FSSs in Delay
Games [16]). If such an FSS has n memory states, we say
the memory size for the underlying strategy σ is n.
Definition 5 (FSS): A finite-state strategy (FSS) for
Player i in POSG G is a tuple Ai = (Ni, nIi , γi, δi), where
Ni is a finite set of memory states, nIi ∈ Ni is the initial
memory state, γi is the action mapping γi : Ni × Zi →
Distr(Act), and δi is the memory update δi : Ni × Zi ×
Act → Distr(Ni). The set FSSGk denotes the set of FSSs
with k memory states, called k-FSSs.
At each stage of the game, for each player, from a node n
and the observation z in the current state of the POSG, the
next action a is chosen from Act(z) randomly as given by
γ(n, z). Then, the successor node of the FSS is determined
randomly via δ(n, z, a).
A POSG for Secure Autonomy: With the FSS assumption,
the goal is then to maximize the probability of satisfying
mission specifications, e.g. reach goal region while avoiding
obstacles in the presence of cyber-adversarial activity. Next,
we formally define the game objective.
Game Objective: For a POSG G and a mission specifica-
tion defined by a temporal logic formula ϕ, we consider the
probability PrG(ϕ) to satisfy ϕ.
The specification ϕ is satisfied for a strategy σ = (σ◦, σ)
and the POSG G with probability λ ∈ [0, 1], if the probability
PrG
σ
(ϕ) = λ or simply if the induced Markov chain by
applying strategy σ satisfies the specification with probabil-
ity λ. At this point, we have the following game formulation
of secure autonomy problem.
Problem 1: Given a POSG G = (G,Z◦, Z, O◦, O),
mission specification defined by a temporal logic for-
mula ϕ, memory bounds n◦ for the decision maker and
n for the cyber-adversary, compute a FSS σ∗◦ such
that
σ∗◦ = argmax
σ◦∈FSSGn◦
min
σ∈FSSGn
PrG
σ
(ϕ).
In Problem 1, we look for worst-case resilient strategies
such that the probability of satisfying the specifications
is maximized. Alternatively, we can search for resilient
strategies that maximize the expected value of meeting the
specifications in the presence of adversarial activity. Indeed,
we can approximate PrG
σ
(ϕ) with an expected total cost type
constraint [3]. Then, for reachability type formulae such as
ϕ = T (eventually reach a goal region represented by the
states in T ), where T ⊂ S. The solution to Problem 1 can be
found by solving an optimization problem as follows (see [1]
for the derivation for one-sided POSGs).
For s◦ ∈ S◦, and s ∈ S, we define the cost variables
cs◦ ≥ 0 cs ≥ 0 that represent the expected cost of reaching
T ⊆ S with csI being the expected cost of reaching to
T from the initial state sI . Let γ ∈ [0, 1) be the discount
factor to ensure finite total expected cost. We then have the
optimization problem:
minimize
cs◦ ,σ◦
maximize
cs ,σ
csI (1)
subject to
cs = 0, ∀s ∈ T, (2)∑
a∈Act◦
σza = 1, ∀z ∈ Z, (3)∑
a∈Act
σza = 1, ∀z ∈ Z◦, (4)
cs = C(s, a) + γ
∑
a∈Act◦
σO(s)a
∑
s′◦∈S◦
P(s, a, s′◦) cs′◦ ,
∀s ∈ S \ T, ∀σO(s)a ∈ σ, (5)
cs◦ = C(s◦, a) + γ
∑
a∈Act
σO(s◦)a
∑
s′∈S
P(s◦, a, s′) cs′ ,
∀s◦ ∈ S◦ \ T, ∀σO(s◦)a ∈ σ◦. (6)
The objective in (1) implies the decision maker ◦ is
minimizing the cost of reaching T from the initial state;
whereas, the cyber-adversary  is trying the maximize the
cost. We assign the expected cost of the states in the target set
T to 0 by the constraints in (2). We ensure that the strategies
of the decision maker and the cyber-adversary are well-
defined with the constraints in (3) and (4). The constraints
in (5)–(6) give the computation for the expected cost in the
states of the POSG via dynamic programming.
We will develop methods based on heuristics and nonlinear
programming to solve the resultant POSGs algorithmically
and we will study trade-offs between resilience (cyber side)
Fig. 4. Three robots involved in experimental evaluations at CAST: (left)
quadruped, (center) Segway, and (right) Flipper.
and mission goals (physical side). Preliminary work in
solving POSGs was carried out in [1] for the case when
only the adversary is subject to partial observation with
application to network security. Instead of solving the full
game, we used model checking to synthesize a set of strong
(sub-optimal) strategies for the adversary and then composed
robust defensive strategies.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The efficacy of the developed methods will be evalu-
ated through experiments with three autonomous agents (a
Segway, a quadruped, and a Flipper robot) in Caltech’s
Center for Autonomous Systems and Technologies (CAST)
as depicted in Figure 4. The quadruped and the Flipper
robot will be tasked to locate the target and the obstacles,
respectively; whereas, the Segway is able to retrieve the
target once the quadruped and Flipper explore the area.
Flipper is equipped with a 3D LIDAR and a router. The
quadruped robot is equipped with a high-resolution camera,
an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and a router. The
Segway only has wheel odometry, an IMU, and a router.
The centralized decision making is carried out through a
computer connected to the robots via a wifi network. The
sensor signals of each robot are also sent back to the
computer via the same network.
Our previous experiments in this setting were concerned
with safe autonomy enforced by discrete-time barrier func-
tions [4], i.e., in the absence of cyber-adversaries (watch the
experimental demonstration at [13]).
The goal of our next set of experiments is to find and re-
trieve the target in the presence of cyber adversarial activity.
This experimental setup is described next.
The states of the POSG for Player ◦ (the decision-
maker) correspond to the locations of each agent, obstacles,
and the goal. The actions for Player ◦ include moving
Left,Right, Up,Down for each agent. The two states of
Player  (cyber-adversary) are Quadruped, F lipper cor-
responding to the two surveying agents. The actions of
the attacker are to TakeDown or Wait. If TakeDown
is chosen at one stage of the game, for example, for the
Flipper robot, the robot will not move in the next step and
its observation cannot be used for path planning. On the other
hand, Wait means no action is taken by the adversary.
The objective of Player ◦ is then to maximize the probabil-
ity of retrieving the target and avoiding obstacles; whereas,
the Player  attempts to minimize this probability. This
POSG fits in the framework of Section II and can be used
to assure high-level mission autonomy as well as cyber-
resilience. This initial abstract problem formulation will
provide a basis for more realistic (high-fidelity) solutions to
the real-world problem in future work, e.g., examining real
injected cyber-attacks and practical defensive responses.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We described our ongoing research on the fusion of
autonomous decision making and active cyber-resilience. We
proposed a POSG that can capture high-level mission specifi-
cations, uncertainty, partial observation, and adversarial deci-
sion making. Although finding optimal strategies for POSGs
is undecidable, we discussed finite-memory strategies as
computationally tractable alternatives. Finally, we presented
an experimental testbed, methodology and a case study to
evaluate our secure autonomy techniques in the future.
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